W H Auden and the Criterion of the Ear by Sharpe, Anthony Edward
1 
 
Hearing Is Believing: W.H. Auden and the Criterion of the Ear 
 
In his lecture ‘Sounding Auden’ (1986), Seamus Heaney argued that Auden’s early poetry had 
introduced an unprecedented new note, by which it ‘brought native English poetry as near as it has 
ever been to the imaginative verge of the dreadful and offered an example of how insular experience 
and the universal shock suffered by mankind in the twentieth century could be sounded forth in the 
English language’.1 This effect was achieved when, in the best of Poems (1930), ‘the stress of Anglo-
Saxon metre and the gnomic clunk of Anglo-Saxon phrasing were pulled like a harrow against the 
natural slope of social speech and iambic lyric’ (Heaney, p. 197).  Auden, however, discarded this 
aggressively de-familiarising tactic, on his journey toward the ‘magnificently sane’ post-war work, 
which in Heaney’s view involved ‘a weakening of his original refusal of the conventional musics’ 
(Heaney, pp. 199, 195).  Although Auden would have agreed with Heaney about the importance of 
‘sounding’ poetry, he might well have taken issue with any disparagement of its ‘conventional 
musics’. In what follows, I want to consider the significances of sound in Auden’s work, which is in 
my view more consistently concerned with hearing something other than ‘the dreadful’.   
Throughout his career Auden composed brief poems, generically identified as ‘Shorts’.  To 
one late group he gave the title ‘Profile’, signifying their autobiographical function, for which in the 
final year of his life he composed some ‘Addenda’, ending with this: 
He has never seen God, 
but, once or twice, he believes 
 he has heard Him.
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                        (CP p. 777) 
While this haiku is not without light humour, its implications involve not only Auden’s theology but 
also his ideas about poetry. We might, perhaps, draw from it the inference that intimations of divine 
presence have more characteristically been manifest for him in music, rather than in the visible 
beauties of creation: Auden valued music highly, and was sometimes scathing about the charms of 
nature – for examples, dismissing the value of landscape as ‘but a background to a torso’ (‘Letter to 
Lord Byron’, EA p. 185), or in ‘Heavy Date’ endorsing Goethe’s view that ‘No one cares to watch 
the/ Loveliest sunset after/ Quarter of an hour’ (CP p. 258). ‘A Walk after Dark’ finds the ‘clockwork 
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spectacle’ of the starry heavens to be ‘slightly boring’ (CP p. 344). Moreover, in not seeing God 
Auden shares the biblically-attested norm, since even Moses only viewed his back: ‘Thou canst not 
see my face: for man shall not see me and live’ (Exodus 33.20). But it does not seem, either, that 
Auden, hearing God, had the kind of experience that would have merited the response, ‘Speak, Lord, 
for Thy servant heareth’ (I Samuel 3.9): the hesitancy of the claim made – ‘once or twice, he believes’ 
– seems indicative of a much more uncertain aural witness, rather than of any divine interlocution.  
Are we, then, talking about the kind of transfiguring effect evoked near the beginning of 
‘New Year Letter’?  
 Where BUXTEHUDE as we played 
 One of his passacaglias made 
 Our minds a civitas of sound 
 Where nothing but assent was found, 
 For art had set in order sense 
 And feeling and intelligence, 
 And from its ideal order grew 
 Our local understanding too.             (CP p. 198) 
Possibly we are, but probably not; for ‘New Year Letter’ places this ‘local understanding’ in the 
context of those violent global misunderstandings which had led, simultaneously, to the outbreak of 
war in Europe. This is, then, no epiphany, and later, in ‘Music Is International’, Auden deflatingly 
contrasted music’s ‘halcyon structures’ with ‘really important’ concerns, ‘Like feeding strays’ (CP p. 
340).  Its writ, therefore, doesn’t run very far beyond the boundaries of its own ‘civitas of sound’: 
music’s setting-in-order resembles that established by a poetry which ‘makes nothing happen’. Yet, 
such ineffectiveness is not the end of the story, for his Yeats elegy goes on to declare that poetry 
‘survives,/ A way of happening, a mouth’ (EA p. 242, both); this foregrounds an embodied voice as its 
true medium, and by extension emphasises the importance of hearing poetry – as when, in The Dyer’s 
Hand, he recalled how his enthusiasm for those Anglo-Saxon sources noted by Heaney had been 
kindled by hearing J.R.R. Tolkien recite from Beowulf. 
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Auden was short-sighted, but despite this the stance of seeing contributed importantly to the 
air of authority in his earlier poetry, in a confident diagnostic surveillance which reached its apogee in 
what Valentine Cunningham has called his ‘panoptic’ effects. The first poem in which he heard his 
own voice, in 1927, began with the assertion, ‘Who stands (…)/Below him sees’ (EA p. 22), and 
injunctions to observe – ‘Look there!’, ‘look there’, ‘Watch any day’ or ‘Look, stranger’ (EA pp. 56, 
46, 31, 157) – were a notable feature of his verse.  The elevated perspective, ‘As the hawk sees it or 
the helmeted airman’ (EA p. 46), whether that of ‘The leader looking over/ Into the happy valley’ (EA 
p. 28), or of ‘Here on the cropped grass of the narrow ridge I stand’ (EA p. 141), or the implied 
spaceman’s view looking down on Spain or observing the onward sweep of nightfall in 
‘Commentary’ (‘Night falls on China…’, EA p. 269), was a characteristic position.  All this might 
undermine any case for the importance, in his work, of what is heard rather than seen.  It is 
interesting, however, to remark that in Auden visual pre-eminence is often augmented or corrected by 
subsequent aural emphasis: ‘The Watershed’ (as subsequently titled) closes on ‘Ears poise before 
decision’; the later ‘stranger’ is instructed to listen as well as to look (‘That through the channels of 
the ear/ May wander…’); the outer-space perspective ends on earth, contrasting ‘the owl’s developed 
ear’ with ‘the anxious sentry’s’ (EA p. 269).  In some ways, then, Auden suggests that hearing, as the 
more intimate sense, may rectify the potential for grandiose self-deception lurking in acts of visionary 
possession. Hearing God, as opposed to seeing him, implies a relationship both more discreet and 
possibly less absolute; when, at the end of ‘In Praise of Limestone’, Auden evokes transcendent 
possibility, he does so in terms that inherently deny transcendence, through an analogy that prioritises 
hearing: ‘when I try to imagine a faultless love/ Or the life to come, what I hear is the murmur/ Of 
underground streams, what I see is a limestone landscape’ (SP p. 187).3 His first example seems 
specific (‘the murmur’), the second generic (‘a…landscape’); any ‘faultless’ love is repudiated as a 
possibility by the poem’s geological awareness, its knowledge that faults inhere in the rocky substrata 
and have in fact made his limestone landscape what it is (Auden had previously used this geological 
pun on the meanings of ‘fault’ in ‘New Year Letter’). 
The criterion of the ear was consistently asserted by Auden, most forcefully when introducing 
his 1935 schools anthology The Poet’s Tongue:  ‘No poetry … which when mastered is not better 
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heard than read is good poetry’.4 The voice, therefore, is vital; but despite this, not all voices heard or 
evoked in his poetry are good or admirable, for if the panoptic view encourages a specious self-
confidence, the pleasures of hearing one’s own voice may overpower doubts modesty might urge, 
about one’s right to utterance or the rectitude of what one says.  To some degree this is the 
consequence of the voice’s corruption by public context, that in Auden’s view led to the vice of 
oratory, evidenced in the Old Boy’s address, the political speech or the sermon (or even poem) in 
which is heard ‘The preacher’s loose immodest tone’ (CP p. 202).  Such individual sonic self-
deception can also occur collectively, as when from that ‘narrow’ Malvern ridge is overheard, 
emanating from jazz-bands in gardens, from cinemas and from cathedrals, ‘The high thin rare 
continuous worship/ Of the self-absorbed’ (EA p. 142); this offers another example of ear succeeding 
eye, although in this case providing a ‘pan-auditory’ supplement to panopticality. The ‘public men’ 
with ‘voices treble with hate’ and the ‘booming old bore’, both encountered in earlier ‘Shorts’ (CP pp. 
296, 295), are examples of people whose voices betray a fundamental loss of self in the very act of 
speaking; Auden came to feel a similar antipathy toward the poet who had publicly declared ‘All I 
have is a voice’ (EA p. 246).  
But the private voice can also be untrustworthy (‘The voice is nearer/ But no clearer’, EA p. 
27). ‘The voice of love saying lightly, brightly – / Be Lubbe, be Hitler’ (EA p. 154) is perhaps not one 
that should command too much attention, associated as it is with the demagogue whom Auden had 
heard ‘shouting’ over the radio in a German café (P 1 p. 73), on his European trip to which this poem 
alludes.  ‘In the policed unlucky city/ Lucky his bed’ (EA p. 152); this acknowledgement of the 
narcissistic gulf instated by poet-lover, between his personal erotic success and the ‘sombre’ political 
landscape of Germany’s Nazification that was its backdrop, leads to a closing emphasis on quieter, 
un-despotic utterance, which ‘the heart repeats though we would not hearken’: ‘Yours is the choice’ 
(EA p. 154). But unlike noisy Hitler’s, this voice can be ignored, and the separation it suggests 
between ‘The language of learning and the language of love’ (EA p. 154) is later reproduced in the 
poem ‘Oxford’ (EA pp. 229-30), which opposes the worlds of learning and of ‘nature’.  Ideally, these 
could be aligned by an instructive love (‘Eros Paidagogos’) but, in Oxford’s ‘talkative city’, are more 
likely to find their potential for union neglected, as the culture drives toward death: ‘And the natural 
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heart refuses/ The low unflattering voice/ That rests not till it find a hearing’.  Edward Mendelson has 
shown how closely this paraphrases Freud’s description, in The Future of an Illusion, of the ‘voice of 
the intellect’;5 and the Freud who, as Auden’s elegy for him would declare, ‘wasn’t clever at all’ (SP 
p. 92) is suitable antagonist, both for Oxford’s self-honouring wisdom and for loud-mouthed Hitler, 
who drove Freud into an exile where his ‘rational voice’ (SP p. 95) is silenced by death. 
There are some indications that early Auden was willing to let nature be his teacher; but if a 
juvenile poem, ‘Nightfall’, waxed lyrical over the ‘Sweet unforgettable ecstasy of sound/ Of leaves 
drinking the young dew’,6 mature Auden was more precise. The third poem of ‘1929’ (as later titled) 
recalls the poet from abstruser musings to a present environment that asserts itself through sound: 
‘Startled by the violent laugh of a jay/ I went from wood, from crunch underfoot’ (EA p. 31). A poem 
written later the same year (and subsequently rejected) rather wordily celebrates the life-affirming 
potential of dawn and endorses reconnection with ‘earth the mother of all life’: ‘Yes, she is always 
with him and will sustain him;/ Often he knows it – caught in a storm on fells/ And sheltering with 
horses behind a dripping wall’ (EA p. 41). Both the admonitory jay and humans’ welcoming the gift 
of a new day anticipate ‘Lauds’ (CP pp. 639-40), which closes his sequence ‘Horae Canonicae’ and in 
which ‘this green world temporal’ announces its renewal through sound: ‘Among the leaves the small 
birds sing;/ The crow of the cock commands awaking’. But – as ‘Prime’, the first poem in the 
sequence, has made clear – ‘awaking’ is only a momentarily innocent state that is quickly succeeded 
by resumption of ‘my historical share of care’ (CP p. 626). For ‘Man is a history-making creature’7  
and is, by this inclination, separated from the animals, for which he may have fellow-feeling but 
which do not inhabit the same ethical universe. The horses sharing his moment of shelter, above, 
might have seemed companionable, but are akin to the innocently indifferent ‘torturer’s horse’ of 
‘Musée des Beaux Arts’ (EA p. 237), or the animals that ‘will not look’ in the final stanza of ‘Spain’ 
(SP p. 55); the cock of ‘Lauds’ is, after all, of the same species as one heard in ‘Homage to Clio’: 
                 Woken at sun-up to hear 
    A cock pronounce himself himself 
 Though all his sons had been castrated and eaten, 
    I was glad I could be unhappy                                                
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As the same poem notes, ‘to chirp like a tearless bird,/ As though no one dies in particular’ (CP p. 
609, both) is literally and metaphorically inhuman, as, in a different register, is the behaviour of those 
stockbrokers ‘roaring like beasts on the floor of the Bourse’ (EA p. 242), as if Yeats had not died ‘in 
particular’. We may imagine, hearing a burdened donkey bray, that its is ‘a choking wail/ of utter 
protest at what is the case’ (CP p. 542), or, by contrast, that birds’ dawn chorus expresses our own 
gladness at greeting a new day; but there is a difference, defined in ‘The Cave of Nakedness’ (about 
Auden’s Austrian bedroom):   
    in the half-dark, members of an avian orchestra 
 are already softly noodling, limbering up for 
    an overture at sunrise, their effort to express 
 in the old convention they inherit that joy in beginning 
    for which our species was created, and declare it 
              good.                                                                                  (CP p. 711) 
We have in common with most of the animal kingdom five senses in our bodily existence 
whose teleology, as implied above, is that we ‘Bless what there is for being’: the poem in which that 
injunction occurs, ‘Precious Five’, adding the rhetorical question, ‘What else am I made for?’ (CP p. 
589). This very purpose, theologically derived, discriminates us from animals, and endows the noises 
that we make with added import. ‘Their Lonely Betters’ considers the garden noises and the 
wordlessness of animals – the robin reciting ‘The Robin-Anthem which was all it knew’ – and the fact 
that none ‘could have with a rhythm or a rhyme/ Assumed responsibility for time’. Language makes 
us better, but more responsible and also more ‘lonely’ than they are: ‘We, too, make noises when we 
laugh or weep:/ Words are for those with promises to keep’ (CP p. 581, all). This Frostian ending 
enforces the ethical inherency of language; and although a sonnet such as ‘Objects’ does its best to 
praise the extra-linguisticity of material being, ‘Those wordless creatures who are there as well’ 
whose ‘bestial substance’ we share, the ‘soul’ we have, with its moral and linguistic consequences, is 
ours alone (CP p. 622). The world of ‘love’ that we evoke may, biologically, be much less necessary 
than the presence of water, as the final line of ‘First Things First’ acknowledges; yet that poem’s 
construal of a message of love out of a storm’s ‘interjectory uproar’, and the emotional and 
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imaginative contours of its personal mythology, deciphering ‘a Proper Name’ from the noise of 
‘storminess’ (CP p. 581), are not entirely disavowed. (There seems to be an allusion here to The 
Tempest III iii 100: ‘The winds did sing it to me, and the thunder,/ That deep and dreadful organ pipe, 
pronounced/ The name of Prosper’.) 
There is, for Auden, an implied sonic hierarchy, upward from noise to sound (which is noise 
shaped either expressively or receptively), to speech (which is sound shaped by meaning), to song 
(which is speech shaped by music). This partially overlaps with his geographical hierarchy, whereby 
North is the ‘good’ direction and the southern Mezzogiorno (although he briefly approved its 
fireworks on Saints’ days) practises ‘noise/ As a countermagic’ (CP p. 642); thus, when visiting a site 
of northernmost longing, in ‘Hammerfest’, it is the purity of sound that strikes him (‘something odd 
was happening/ Sound-wise’): 
                                        A listening terrain 
 Seized on them all and never gave one back in echo, 
    As if to land as desolate, as far up, 
 Whatever noise our species cared to make still mattered. 
    Here was a place we had yet to disappoint.                       (CP p. 725)    
Its unsullied note has survived even the depredations of an occupying German army, and although 
disappointment must inevitably occur, the association of holiness with a quality of sound so rarefied 
as to suggest silence implies a still higher point of the hierarchy I have proposed. In ‘First Things 
First’ the storm’s noise paradoxically recalls, from his 1936 trip to Iceland with Michael Yates, ‘a day 
of peculiar silence/ When a sneeze could be heard a mile off’ (CP p. 581); in ‘The Cave of Making’ 
he confides to MacNeice how ‘Speech can at best, a shadow echoing/ the silent light, bear witness/ to 
the Truth it is not’ (CP p. 692). A similar line of thought is expressed in another poem from the 
sequence ‘Thanksgiving for a Habitat’, where ‘To-Night at Seven-Thirty’ evokes and complicatedly 
celebrates the dinner-party’s sociabilities, but ends asserting the signified of which these are the 
signifiers, seeing ‘in swallowing/ a sign-act of reverence,/ in speech a work of re-presenting/ the true 
olamic silence’ (CP p. 709).8 
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As Diarmaid MacCulloch has set forth in Silence: A Christian History, there is a long, if 
semi-occluded, tradition of silence as the highest end of religious contemplation, in ‘that apophatic 
approach to divinity which portrays what God is not, rather than what he is. (…) Apophatic 
Christianity or negative theology is a religion of spirit, of looking inwards’.9 As opposed to the 
Scriptural attention which, by the act of reading, emphasises sight, ‘paying attention to silence 
involves a different sense, hearing’ (MacCulloch p. 235).  When, in his introduction, MacCulloch 
notes that ‘for Paul and for those who follow the Christian way, the crucified one is more powerful in 
his silent suffering than any power of this world or even of the next’ (MacCulloch p. 8), such an 
observation leads almost directly, it might seem, to Auden’s poem ‘Friday’s Child’, and its closing 
evocation of ‘a silence on the cross,/ As dead as we shall ever be’ which, paradoxically, ‘Speaks of 
some total gain or loss’.  ‘Friday’s Child’, however, lacks that assurance of power that MacCulloch 
ascribes to the Pauline position, as the poem contrasts its own uncertainty with ‘conscious 
unbelievers’ who are ‘sure of Judgement Day’ (CP p. 674, all).  While Auden was aware, as these 
examples show, of claims of the ultimate superiority of silence, and while his poem echoes ‘that 
greatest Christian silence of all, the Resurrection, (…) the silence at the heart of Christian literature’ 
(MacCulloch p. 40), he ultimately identified himself with the views of St Augustine, whom 
MacCulloch defines as one relatively indifferent to the ‘theme of silence’, by contrast with ‘his 
fascination with language and human psychology as revelations of the nature of God’ (MacCulloch p. 
89).  This seems to me equally applicable to Auden, and his sense that the poet’s obligation is to work 
within speech and language, attempting through a fallen medium to counteract destructive tendencies 
highlighted by one of the short poems appended to his MacNeice elegy: ‘Speechless Evil/ Borrowed 
the language of Good/ And reduced it to noise’ (CP p. 694).  What poetry does, in its survival as ‘a 
way of happening, a mouth’, is to preserve speech as ‘language’ rather than as ‘noise’; and to do this 
ascribes a value to the voice that speaks and the ear that hears, located in the fleshly human medium 
and not in any extra-sensory transcendent state. To ‘hear’ God is to be within earshot of God, to 
receive an actual vibration: it is not a ‘religion of spirit, looking inwards’, working on absence, but an 
implicitly positive theology, relating to presence.  
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This becomes clearer as Auden moves away from a Kierkegaardian theology, which was a 
means by which he re-embraced Christianity but which, as he later noted, paid insufficient regard to 
the body.  It was appropriate that he took the pen-name ‘Didymus’ when publishing a series of 
wartime ‘lecture notes’ in the Swarthmore student magazine: for ‘doubting Thomas’, as he is more 
popularly known, insisted on bodily evidence before believing in Christ’s resurrection. As Mendelson 
has shown,
10
 the body became increasingly important to Auden (despite his unharmonious relation to 
his own), as the means by which we are and by which we do good and evil. It is the enabling site of 
all our experience, including the varieties of religious experience, and if on one hand through 
corporeality we are connected with the animal kingdom that, in all its varieties, is similarly embodied, 
on the other, through Incarnation and the historical actuality of Jesus the body links us to God, 
according to Christian theology (as Gerard Manley Hopkins put it: ‘I am all at once what Christ is 
since he was what I am’).11  ‘Our bodies cannot love:/ But, without one,/ What works of Love could 
we do?’ asks Auden (CP p. 712): the ‘love’ here is both general and specific, simultaneously of the 
flesh and of the spirit. The sense of hearing is more corporeally located than that of sight, one might 
argue, because the latter more readily colludes with fantasies of incorporeality (as in Emerson’s 
‘transparent eye-ball’ rapture,12 for example, suggestive of an ‘out-of-body experience’); to ‘hear’ 
God may therefore be to appreciate that ‘God’ is fundamentally inseparable from the creation which 
also includes ourselves. As Julian of Norwich put it (in words Auden used as epigraph for his poem 
‘Memorial for the City’): ‘In the self-same point that our soul is made sensual, in the self-same point 
is the City of God ordained to him from without beginning’ (quoted, CP p. 589). Auden himself 
would express a similar thought in a piece about Kierkegaard, when asserting that ‘as a creature 
composed of matter, as a biological organism, every man, in common with everything else in the 
universe, is related by necessity to the God who created that universe and saw that it was good’ (P 3 
p. 579). 
This is not to suggest, however, that human hearing may not involve its own deceptions. 
What an earlier poem described as ‘the limits and the lack’ (EA p. 151) of purely creaturely existence 
are – in ‘At the Party’, written thirty years later – audible at a human occasion which, despite its 
seeming hospitality, amounts to no more than a depressing cacophony of self-assertiveness: 
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 A howl for recognition, shrill with fear, 
 Shakes the jam-packed apartment, but each ear 
 Is listening to its hearing, so none hear.                         (CP p. 737) 
Hearing can be turned inward, and the egotistical meanings of the conversations fragmentarily 
overheard represent speech degenerating to the condition of noise. To Auden-as-Jeremiah, these 
Manhattan sophisticates, bandying ‘names in fashion’ back and forth, most resemble the robin 
reiterating its territorially-aggressive (and significantly capitalised) ‘Robin-Anthem’; for this is the 
world described in ‘City Without Walls’ as ‘idiorhythmic’ (CP p. 748), following behavioural 
patterns its own appetites dictate. Auden would not have dissented from the Lawrentian view that 
animals have their own integrity, in being animals, but suggests that we humans lose ours in 
resembling them. 
‘Needing above all/ silence and warmth, we produce/ brutal cold and noise’ (CP p. 787). 
Although the history that we make may also be at times cacophonous (‘The Common Life’ refers to 
‘History’s criminal noise’ (CP p. 714): that is, history as megaphoned by Hitler or Stalin), our shaping 
tendencies are what redeem us, our willingness to ‘take responsibility for time’. ‘Rhythm’ and 
‘rhyme’ are the poetic signs of such responsibility; Auden described the egotistical ‘chatter’ of ‘At the 
Party’ as ‘Unrhymed, unrhythmical’ (CP p. 737), partly implying that its toxicity derives from failure 
to attend to anything exterior to the self’s priorities; there is a disciplinary externalising structure to 
language which, neglected, darkens the mind, in ‘Ode to Terminus’: ‘discarding, rhythm, punctuation, 
metaphor,/ it sinks into a drivelling monologue’ (CP p. 810). No wonder, then, that he emphasised the 
beneficial effect of formal obligations, in a late ‘Short’: ‘Blessed be all metrical rules that forbid 
automatic responses,/ force us to have second thoughts, free from the fetters of Self’ (CP p. 857).  In 
conforming to such pre-established patterns, a poet acknowledges the voices other than his or her own 
which have established usage and, enabling the reader to hear these effects, opens the poem as a site 
of confluence rather than of simple self-enunciation. The self is not obliterated in such collaborations: 
‘In Praise of Limestone’ notes how its ‘band of rivals’ walk ‘sometimes/ Arm in arm but never, thank 
God, in step’ (SP p. 185), and another ‘Short’ insists that when men are ‘truly brothers’ they ‘don’t 
sing in unison/ but in harmony’ (CP p. 887). 
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 But if such audible responsibility toward time thwarts any impulse to automatically sing the 
song of ‘Self’, like a cock or a robin, there is, Auden equally recognised, a wrong kind of resonance, a 
wrong kind of deference to an audience, a wrong estimation of the claim of the external world upon 
your poem. He believed this the more keenly, for feeling he had himself infringed in these respects, as 
one of those who ‘round about 1931 began to take up politics as an exciting new subject to write 
about’ (EA p. 403); what is at issue here is less the suitability of politics as potential subject, than the 
insincerity of its opportunistic adoption as materia poetica. This can lead to crowd-pleasing, of the 
kind noted in passing by ‘In Praise of Limestone’ when it instances one who ‘ruin[s] a fine tenor 
voice/ For effects that bring the house down’ (SP p. 185) or, worse, to the making of untrue 
statements, such as Auden came to feel he detected at the close of ‘Spain’: ‘It would have been bad 
enough if I had ever held this wicked doctrine, but that I should have stated it simply because it 
sounded to me rhetorically effective is quite inexcusable’ (CP p. xxx). He also concluded that 
seductions of sound and the blandishments of rhetoric had underlain his thraldom to Yeats, telling 
Stephen Spender in 1965 that ‘through no fault of his own he has become for me a symbol of my own 
devil of unauthenticity, of everything which I must try to eliminate from my own poetry, false 
emotions, inflated rhetoric, empty sonorities’ (quoted Early A, p. 206).  ‘Ode to Terminus’ ends 
declaring that ‘abhorred in the Heav’ns are all/ self-proclaimed poets who, to wow an/ audience, utter 
some resonant lie’ (CP p. 811).     
‘Empty sonorities’ and ‘effects that bring the house down’ imply the speciousness of sound in 
the making of false music. What, then, would be characteristic of a true music and the right kind of 
resonance? Auden’s ‘Notes on Music and Opera’, in The Dyer’s Hand, takes as one of its epigraphs 
Hugo von Hoffmansthal’s assertion that ‘Singing is near miraculous because it is the mastering of 
what is otherwise a pure instrument of egotism: the human voice’ (quoted DH p. 465). In part, the 
technical application necessary to becoming a good singer and consequent submission to the rules of 
harmony ensure a tempering of the ego, which resembles that effected by the poet in obeying 
‘metrical rules’; such tempering is amplified by the fact that it is unusual for the voice that sings to be 
that of either composer or librettist. The vocalist to this extent sacrifices individual identity, becomes 
personally disinterested in order to achieve the aesthetic goal of delivering someone else’s words and 
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music, however personally coloured in the performing. This resembles the effect, of creating a ‘civitas 
of sound’ in a duet where selves collaborate rather than compete, that Auden wrote about in ‘New 
Year Letter’; but there is, for him, a dimension added by the singing voice that exceeds the scope of 
purely instrumental performance:  
To me, vocal music plays the part in music that the human nude plays in painting. In both  
there is an essential erotic element which is always in danger of being corrupted for sexual 
ends but need not be and, without this element of the erotic which the human voice and the 
nude have contributed, both arts would be a little lifeless.             (DH pp. 505-6) 
Both the nude and the voice install the unadorned or unassisted human body at the centre of their 
respective arts, and in doing so bring into alignment the world of nature and the world of artifice. 
There is a celebration of the knowingness of art, in this, that Auden caught in one of the shorts in 
‘Symmetries and Asymmetries’: ‘The brook’s impromptu babble/ Suggested to Orpheus/ A cunning 
song’ (CP p. 730). The brook is spontaneous and unreflective, so the ‘cunning’ of poetic response to 
natural phenomena simultaneously registers a potential estrangement, through sophistication – 
therefore an asymmetry.  The song can never be as artless as the brook, but, as the brook cannot, at 
greatest moments the singing voice has power to suggest a world magnificently arranged: ‘Every high 
C accurately struck demolishes the theory that we are the irresponsible puppets of fate or chance’ (DH 
p. 474).   
Yet the very resonance of that assertion begins to overstrain, hinting at some transcendent 
state in which we triumph ‘over Death, and Chance, and thee O Time’,13 when Auden’s deeper 
conviction was that the basic musical responsibility to keep in time was both a minor practical and a 
major philosophical injunction. To Clio, ‘Muse of Time’, he suggested how ‘Lives that obey you 
move like music,/ Becoming now what they only can be once,/ Making of silence decisive sound’ (CP 
p. 611). That high C, which cannot be sustained beyond a physical limit, derives its power and glory 
from the relationship with antithetical states of silence and failure which it implies, and of which the 
listening ear is aware, knowing the note must end and that it might lose pitch. To ‘move like music’ is 
to move in sequence through time, with each note constituting a ‘now’ that is its own immediacy; 
such a ‘way of happening’ implies submission to, rather than any triumph over time. Auden could 
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concede that silence may well be the superior state – for example, believing it better not to write a 
love-poem, but instead to explain in prose the reasons why (‘Dichtung und Wahrheit’). Nor was it his 
conviction that God would necessarily prefer an operatic high C to the sweaty but devout acrobatics 
performed in ‘The Ballad of Barnaby’ (a ‘commissioned work’ intended for guitar accompaniment, 
CP p. 824); he saw that aesthetic criteria, by which poets and musicians set such store, are irrelevant 
to the effectiveness or otherwise of a devotional rite such as the celebration of Eucharist, and he 
professed some unease whether indeed poetry was of any particular significance to Christianity: ‘A 
poet who calls himself a Christian cannot but feel uncomfortable when he realizes that the New 
Testament contains no verse (except in the apocryphal, and gnostic, Acts of John), only prose’ (DH p. 
459). This is of a piece with his doubting, at the end of ‘Homage to Clio’, that she ever reads poetry, 
of his repeated assertion that poetry was ‘small beer’, and of his conviction, stated in Secondary 
Worlds, that ‘since the Word was made Flesh, it is impossible to imagine God as speaking in anything 
but the most sober prose’.14     
This laconic austerity of divine utterance perpetually wrong-foots the garrulous poet, giving 
added force to Kierkegaard’s perception that ‘Before God we are always in the wrong’ (quoted by 
Auden in a 1940 letter to Spender);
15
 for what can be done to atone for a continuing commitment to 
patterned language, once one has reached Prospero’s perception: ‘I never suspected the way of truth/ 
Was a way of silence’ (CP p. 409)?16 Auden’s increasing adoption of syllabics, which is a metric 
declaring itself to the abacus rather than the ear, may, as Edward Mendelson has suggested, have been 
a move away from the ‘assertive power’ of his earlier bravura poems;17 but, as Mendelson goes on to 
argue, it is a means by which rhythms inherent in the language itself become the principal auditory 
element. It is a less ostentatious poetic performance, that requires less evident skill to manage than 
forms like the villanelle or sestina, and removes much stilted resonance; like the ‘Shorts’ Auden 
copiously composed, there is no effort to impress or overwhelm. Yet, if we might argue that this 
suggests a more democratically-inclined and conversational Auden, the increasing appearance in his 
later poetry of inkhorn terms culled from deep inside the unabridged OED seems to pull in a contrary 
direction: both, however, different as their registers appear, can be seen as celebrations of language 
and all its possibilities.  
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Auden wrote of Yeats that he would be pardoned ‘for writing well’ (EA p. 243), and although 
this does not necessarily imply that one should be damned for writing badly (‘Tear him for his bad 
verses!’, as the mob urges in Julius Caesar), on three occasions – in ‘Letter to Lord Byron’, in ‘New 
Year Letter’ and, most heartfelt, in the final poem appended to his elegy for MacNeice – he conflated 
the Last Judgment with literary judgment. In the two earlier poems he had imagined a jury of 
illustrious precursors adjudicating his own case, but in the shorter poem God himself nullifies 
Auden’s defence that a bad life nevertheless produced good poetry, by demonstrating how a good life 
could have made it better still: 
  God may reduce you 
 on Judgement Day 
  to tears of shame, 
 reciting by heart 
  the poems you would 
 have written, had 
  your life been good.          (CP p. 695) 
‘Aways in the wrong’, indeed: to hear God doing this, while again it emphasises the spoken poem, 
would be ultimately chastening; but common to these courtroom scenes is the inference that poetry is 
as much a matter of Heaney’s ‘rational voice’ and ‘conventional musics’ as of Romantic inspiration or 
subconscious intuition. Just as Auden’s daily regimen of sitting down to write and the regularity of his 
composition differentiated him from Eliot, so his emphasis on the writing of poetry as a regulated 
activity – not for nothing did he cite Pope as an important influence – meant that the sounds he heard 
in poetry and the metrical rules that governed it were matters of lucid calculation (literally, in 
syllabics), unlike that Jungian mysticism Eliot defined as ‘the auditory imagination’ (a formulation 
which Heaney found useful): ‘the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious 
levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, 
returning to the origin and bringing something back’.18 
Eliot placed some emphasis on the involuntary sources of poetry: ‘Why, for all of us, out of 
all that we have heard, seen, felt, in a lifetime, do certain images recur, charged with emotion, rather 
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than others?’; his answer was that ‘they come to represent the depths of feeling into which we cannot 
peer’ (UPUC p. 148). The absence, in Auden’s poetry, of anything apparently corresponding to 
Eliot’s deep element of the unknowable, has led some fellow-poets to question the voice that he 
developed after the poems of his earliest maturity. In Heaney’s view: 
Auden arrived at a mode that was stricken with premonitions of an awful thing and was 
adequate to give expression to those premonitions by strictly poetic means. But this unified 
sensibility fissured when Auden was inevitably driven to extend himself beyond the trans-
mission of intuited knowledge, beyond poetic indirection and implication, and began spelling 
out those intuitions in a more explicit, analytic and morally ratified rhetoric.    
(Heaney p. 199) 
Auden might, then, be condemned, rather than pardoned, for ‘writing well’, in too consciously-
controlled an exercise. Philip Larkin implied that Auden’s abandonment of the ‘common dialect’ of 
English as it is actually spoken meant that the later poetry was insufficiently informed by plausibility 
of voice and, more recently, Sean O’Brien has written of Auden’s ‘anxiety about the irrational 
element in the appeal of poetry itself’, and of his consequent deployment of ‘a myth of Reason in 
which no poet, Auden included, can finally believe’; O’Brien sees this as a ‘flight from the daemonic’ 
(WHAContext pp. 334, 335).  In ‘New Year Letter’, when Auden remembers his boyhood self’s 
having stirred ‘the reservoir of darkness’ (CP p 226) by dropping pebbles down a flooded mineshaft, 
the upshot is a consciousness of ‘guilt’, a turning-away from the dark Mother, and a continuation of 
the poem’s tetrameter couplets on its self-defined mission ‘To set in order’ (CP p. 198). Craig Raine 
has judged that Auden’s re-adoption of Christianity was ‘inimical to his poetic gifts’;19 it is almost as 
if, having taken Kierkegaard’s wholly irrational ‘leap of faith’ as a means of establishing through 
Christianity an absolute moral standpoint (as Auden explained it in his contribution to Modern 
Canterbury Pilgrims), there was no need for further acts of unreason. The voice that becomes audible 
in Auden is one that tries, in unillusioned manner, to ‘Find the mortal world enough’ (EA p. 207) 
without resorting to coercive rhetorical strategies; a sense of responsibility to time predominates. The 
sound whose absence from Auden’s verse Heaney regrets might be inseparable from those ‘empty 
sonorities’ Auden himself came to reject. 
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A poem can only stand as sign toward the ‘true olamic silence’ beyond itself; Kierkegaard’s 
perception of inevitable wrongness before God becomes, seen in a more forgiving light, less a 
condemnation than a permission to work, as fallen creatures, with the materials to hand, which 
include our bodies and our language. This informs Auden’s poem ‘Whitsunday in Kirchstetten’, 
which even as it contemplates the Christian celebration of language mended, in the rectification of 
Babel at Pentecost – ‘we who were born/ congenitally deaf are able/ to listen now to rank outsiders’ 
(CP p. 743) – also accurately observes the world that is the case, measuring the difference between a 
vision of mutually-comprehending amity and the fractured actualities of both the local and geo-
political situations beyond the church’s walls, where threats of mutually assured destruction resound. 
It is a world much in need of the visitation of the Holy Spirit solicited, in German, in its opening line: 
‘Komm Schöpfer Geist I bellow’ (CP p. 742).  I have written about this poem elsewhere, but will note 
here that its taking an epigraph from the only poetry in (or near) the New Testament is potentially a 
sign of poetic admission, in keeping with the inclusiveness that is theme of this celebration, affirming 
that ‘The Holy Ghost/ does not abhor a golfer’s jargon,/ a Lower-Austrian accent, the cadences even/ 
of my own little anglo-american/ musico-literary set’ (CP p. 743). Yet, offering such definitions, the 
language reinstalls a world stubbornly untransfigured while, at the same time, accepting it as the 
unperfected ‘Middle-Earth’ (CP p. 569) appropriate to humankind, which another poem calls ‘a 
creature/ Who comes in median size’ (CP p. 740). The poem is full of noises, from that opening 
bellow to the tower-bells which ‘clash’ or the altar-bell which ‘makes a noise’ (CP pp. 743, 744), or 
the different languages deployed amid its English (German, Italian, Latin, French); all are accepted in 
a similar spirit to that which asks Clio to ‘forgive our noises’ (CP p. 611). The bellowed hymn and the 
improbable closing image of Auden dancing alike emphasise that element he saw as intrinsic to public 
worship, in which ‘we bring our bodies to God’,20 with all our imperfections on our heads. Perfection, 
after all, is a divine attribute, and when aspired to by humans brings forth monsters like Auden’s 
‘Tyrant’ (‘Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after’, EA p. 239), who is also related to the ‘Ogre’ 
Auden later saw manifested in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, likewise representing the sleep 
of reason in his failure to inhabit language: ‘The Ogre cannot master speech’ (CP pp.  804). 
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Early and late, Auden knew that the noisiness of the world was one of its defining modern 
characteristics, whether as the ‘noonday roar,/ Guttural, the personal cry of a great city’ (EA p. 41) or 
the increasingly intrusive mass media – ‘louder today the wireless roars/ Its warnings and its lies’ (EA 
p. 156); ‘His radio Homers all day long/ In over-Whitmanated song/ That does not scan’ (CP p. 336) 
– or the ‘witless noise’ used as a prophylactic against ‘the basilisking/ glare of Nothing’ (CP p. 748). 
But poetry’s task is, by making shaped sound out of noise, to work toward a consecration of language 
which, being spoken and heard, is of the body, and being understood, is of the mind: when Auden 
celebrated the medieval poets, he emphasised the physicality of a relationship in which they are ‘on 
hand to delect my ear and chuckle/ my sad flesh’ (CP p. 864).  This attitude necessarily involves 
acknowledging ‘the primary phenomenal world as it is, (…) in which the sun moves across the sky 
from east to west, the  stars are hung like lamps in the vault of heaven, the measure of magnitude is 
the human body’; as Auden’s imagery makes clear, such recognition permits a certain poetic licence, 
and he went on to hope that acceptance of limits would encourage in artists modesty and ‘a sense of 
humour’, and even ‘a return, in a more sophisticated form, to a belief in the phenomenal world as a 
realm of sacred analogies’ (SW p. 144, all).  This attitude, in the last stanza of ‘Prologue at Sixty’, is 
enacted by the unanticipated enjambment which opens the closed circuit of human interlocution 
toward just such an analogy:  
 To speak is human because human to listen, 
 beyond hope, for an Eighth Day, 
 when the creatured Image shall become the Likeness.   (CP p. 832)  
But, until such reconciliation, the primary phenomenal world remains the analogical source of 
sacredness, as limestone suggests a possible paradise and the bellowing, clumsily dancing body 
indicates perfection it cannot achieve, while being nonetheless ‘the measure of magnitude’. In ‘No, 
Plato, No’, Auden asserts that he ‘can’t imagine anything / that I would less like to be/ than a 
discarnate Spirit’; but if Platonism represents an extreme of the spirit, an extreme of the flesh is 
embodied in its final decomposition, when it becomes ‘irresponsible Matter’. Between those 




Thus placed, his poetic compositions are acts of responsible language. ‘There is only one 
thing’, Auden declared at the end of his inaugural lecture at Oxford, ‘that all poetry must do; it must 
praise all it can for being and for happening’ (DH p. 60). Although this resembles Hopkins’s 
celebration of profusion and his final injunction in ‘Pied Beauty’ (‘He fathers-forth whose beauty is 
past change:/ Praise him’; Hopkins, p. 31), rather than God himself, the object of Auden’s praise is the 
material universe which offers our only evidence for God. As he argued, Incarnation means that 
‘matter, the natural order is real and redeemable, not a shadowy appearance or the cause of evil, and 
historical time is real and significant, not meaningless or an endless series of cycles’ (P 3, p. 577). But 
love of ‘the natural order’ and ‘historical time’ could not be naively unknowing; as he told 
MacNeice’s ‘dear Shade’:  
                More than ever 
 life-out-there is goodly, miraculous, loveable, 
   but we shan’t, not since Stalin and Hitler, 
 trust ourselves ever again: we know that, subjectively, 
   all is possible.                                                                        (CP p. 691) 
‘Here silence/ is turned into objects’, was how Auden described his poetic work-room’s function to its 
imagined visitant, where fashioning a made thing out of the subjective silence was a way of 
counteracting subjectivity’s darker possibilities. This room is ‘designed to/ discourage day-dreams 
(…)/ and to sharpen hearing’ (CP p. 690, all), for there is indeed an objective world to be listened to. 
Coleridge paid Charles Lamb the compliment of being one ‘to whom/ No sound is dissonant which 
tells of Life’;21 while we cannot know exactly what Auden intended by his haiku, it is unlikely he 
believed he heard God face to face: but it may be that, ‘once or twice’, when attending to our 
phenomenal world, he heard that it was good. 
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